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Abstract 
To combat with multiple-users interference and malicious eavesdropping, this paper proposes a double scrambling scheme 
over time/wavelength for a cryptographic optical CDMA (OCDMA) data transmission. By using wavelength-spreading/time-
hopping, data reliability in OCDMA network can be highly improved. On the transmitter side, data bits are sliced into spectral 
chips, coded into M-sequence codes, and conducted with different units of time-delay. In the receiver side, fiber-delay lines 
(FDLs) reverse the spectral chips back to the same time basis, and optical switches (OSWs) turn on-off spectral chips into 
balanced detector for the final data decoding. By changing signature code frequently, the eavesdroppers cannot catch on the 
changing code speed and have little chance to detect the channel waveform to solve the code. To against eavesdropping, we take 
advantages of linear cyclic, periodic, and nearly-orthogonal characteristics of M-sequence codes. OSWs and FDLs are added into 
the arrayed-waveguide grating (AWG) codecs. The spectral codes and the time-delay units will follow cell states of a controlling 
shift register. Different shift register states will reconfigure AWG light spectra into different coding sequences. After pass 
through the associated OSWs and FDLs, user signature code appears to be a two-dimensional code matrix. In perspective of 
eavesdropper, smooth eavesdropping presents difficulties due to signature codes’ frequent changing. The system can therefore 
achieve a high level of network confidentiality.  
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1. Introduction 
The security vulnerabilities to the malicious eavesdropping on the OCDMA networks have been widely 
investigated [1]-[3]. To overcome the easy tapping weakness of the conventional on-off keying (OOK) 
transmissions, this paper proposes a double signature-scrambling scheme over wavelength/time to realize a 
cryptographic coded-WDM data network. The wavelength-spreading and time-hopping can be regarded as 
important bases for the encryption and decryption of transmission source data [4], [5]. We will devise arrayed-
waveguide-gratings (AWGs)-based optical network codecs governed with reconfigurable maximal-length sequence 
(M-sequence) codes to against eavesdropping [6].  
In this paper we add in optical switches (OSWs) and fiber-delay lines (FDLs) posterior to the AWG codecs [7]. 
The state of optical switch will depend on shifting control register state. Central controller will monitor the network 
traffic in time. When it detects security threats in the network, a reconfiguring command signal will be sent and the 
state of electrical shift register change for controlling the OSWs and FDLs to prevent the eavesdropping [8]. 
Different shift register states will reconfigure the spectrum through the AWG into different output coding sequence. 
At the decoding side after recovering the delay time, eavesdropper can’t detection information correctly due to the 
system frequency change the assigned code. The system can therefore achieve a high level security.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some general principles of security features and 
categories on OCDMA encoder/decoder technology and presents eavesdropping strategies with illustrating the 
vulnerability of OCDMA network. Section 3 introduces signatures reconfiguration in OCDMA generally. In Section 
4, reconfigurable OCDMA network encoder and decoder structured over time/wavelength coded are illustrated. In 
Section 5, we analyze the security performance on the proposed signatures coding and reconfiguration. Finally, 
concluding remarks are drawn in Section 6.  
 
2. Confidentiality and eavesdropping strategies  
It is important to define the type of security when evaluating the security of communication techniques. 
Security in communications and computer networking is traditionally divided into the categories of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. Confidentiality is the best known and most commonly sought form of security in 
communications on OCDMA system so this paper focuses on data confidentiality, using dynamic reconfigurable 
codes over AWG routers that may be provided by OCDMA techniques.  
In an all-to-all OCDMA network, the data bits of multiple users will transmit simultaneously from all users and 
multiplexed into star coupler. An eavesdropper has basically two ways of locations in to tap signals from an OCDMA 
network. One is before the coupler and the other one is after the coupler. As shown in Figure 1, avoiding the multiple 
user interference (MUI) that is characteristic of OCDMA systems, the eavesdropper will get more benefits on the 
eavesdropping if taps the signal from a specific isolated user in the network. From the point of view of the 
eavesdropper, it is quite difficult on intercepting combined signal to retrieve an isolated data code for eavesdroppers 
in every receiver decoder. On the decoder side, it receives the summed signal from all active transmitters.  
A smart eavesdropper can design a listening device to detect the tapped user [10]. To overcome this problem, 
the way the user has to do is to change the signature code. Lower SNRs would require the eavesdropper to process 
multiple data bits to detect the code correctly. If the transmitter changed the code words more frequently, it is more 
difficult for an eavesdropper to detect the code correctly. Confidentiality could be significantly increased. However, 
code reconfiguration rates would probably need to approach the data rate to achieve a strong assurance of 
confidentiality, since the eavesdropper’s advantage from combining multiple data bits increases quite rapidly.  
A central control node station is supposed to signal the reconfiguration command to change the corresponding 
transceiver signatures. Actually, the reconfiguration command can be issued in two different command-issuing 
mechanisms: (1). Self-regulating codecs: The connection between the optical switch and input ports of AWGs is 
switched in every certain period. This process would not prevent intensive attacks, if the cracking time for 
eavesdroppers is less than the reconfiguring time. Once the signature code of a user is detected by the attacker, the 
attacker has free access to the data until the code is changed. On the other hand, when the system is not intercepted, 
the reconfiguration operation is still running, which would cause extra burden for the network. The advantage of 
self-regulating codecs is relative simple algorithm of attacking-detection for upper layers of network management. 
(2). Dynamic central control: This process is based on the assumption that the upper layers of the network can detect 
the eavesdroppers effectively. The reconfiguration command will change the transceiver signature code to a new one. 
If the network is attacked by the tapper frequently, the command would make optical switch operate faster to 
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reconfigure the signature code so that the tapping process can be blocked. On the other hand, if the network is 
mostly under a secure environment, the frequency of changing signature code could be less. This requires more 
complex design for the central controller node.  
In our paper, the first approach seems not the one suitable for an OCDMA network with large code space 
capability. So our discussions will aim at the second approach with a central controller node design to monitor the 
health of the network. This paper adopts a dynamic reconfigurable mechanism over spectral-amplitude coding 
scheme of OCDMA to against eavesdropping.  
 
3. OCDMA with signatures reconfiguration  
In this paper, we propose a scheme of optical code reconfiguration governed by OCDMA network. We 
structure M-sequence-coded OCDMA network codecs and propose a dynamic reconfigurable codecs scheme with 
optical switches (OSWs) and fiber-delay lines (FDLs) for the cryptographic data transmission. The system structure 
is as shown in Figure Ĳ. Upon our design, the system is divided into two parts both at the encoder and decoder. One 
part is wavelength coding and the other part is time-delay coding. On the transmitter side, data bits are sliced with 
OSWs into spectral chips for wavelength-spreading, and then conducted with different units of time-delay by FDLs 
for time-hopping. In the receiver side, inverse FDLs reverse the combined spectral chips back to the same time basis, 
and OSWs turn on-off spectral chips into balanced detector for the final data decoding.  
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Fig. 1. Reconfigurable OCDMA codecs with eavesdropping protection.  
 
(a). Wavelength coding: For a user capacity of N, there are N optical switches link at the output ports of the 
AWG encoder and 2N optical switches link at input ports of the AWG decoder, respectively. To control these 
optical switches to reach reconfiguration scheme, an electrical shift register which has N elements is set in the 
system as shown in Fig. 2. Whether the optical switches are “on” or “off” is dependent on the state of electrical shift 
register. In this paper we adopt the traditional on-off keying (OOK) scheme to code data bits into signature 
wavelengths. Since the electrical shift register has a value of ‘1’ and the i-th port switch is connected. From another 
point of view the switch disconnected when the element has a value of ‘0’.  
        (b). Time-delay coding: A delay line is provided to achieve the displacement of the time delay and effect of the 
double encryption. After spectrum coding, a series of light pulses is directed to a fiber delay line designed. Thus, the 
codes can be represented as 2-D code matrices in time and wavelength dimensions. The wavelength domain is 
divided into N wavelength channels, and the time domain is divided into N chips. The optical delay lines are also 
controlled by the electric shift register and changed frequently. The value of any time delay outputs dependent on 
the state of electrical shift register according to the BCD (binary-coded decimal) value.  
In this paper, a central node is assumed to monitor network traffic condition and to randomly change signature 
codes assigned for each user to improve the network confidentiality performance. Dynamic central control is based 
on the assumption that the upper layers of the network can detect the eavesdroppers effectively. The reconfiguration 
command will change the transceiver signature code to a new one. If the network is attacked by the tapper 
frequently, the command would make optical switch operate faster to reconfigure the signature code so that the 
tapping process can be blocked.  
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4. Processes on signatures reconfiguration over AWG-based codecs  
In order to reconfigure the code and against eavesdropping, we design optical switch (OSW) link for 
wavelength coding and fiber-delay line (FDL) for time-delay coding. Operations of OSWs and FDLs are dependent 
on the states of the controlling electrical shift register. Designate the u-th user code into Su = (Ou,1,Ou,2, …, Ou,N) = Tu-
1S1, u=1, 2, …, N, which is the binary M-sequence code of code period N= 2m-1. S1 is the initial code vector and Tu 
denotes vector shifts operation cyclically to the right by u-place, in coincidence with the cyclic-shift characteristics 
of M-sequence codes. Under our devise that the shift register state follows the pattern of M-sequence code of period 
N=7. Then with the initial state S1 = (1,1,1,0,0,1,0), the other register states can be obtained by cyclically shifting S1 
to S2 = T1S1 = (0,1,1,1,0,0,1), S3 = T2S1 = (1,0,1,1,1,0,0), and so on.  
As depicted in Fig. 2 on the encoder side, data bits are sliced into spectral chips, coded into M-sequence codes, 
and transmitted to the AWG and optical switches to reach code reconfiguration. The i-th chip of electrical shift 
register state controls the “on” and “off” of the i-th OSW. If the value of chip is ‘1’, the switch connects, and vice 
versa. After spectrum coding, the serial light pulses is directed to bank of FDLs. The FDLs are also controlled by the 
electric shift register. The time delay is designed in accordance with BCD (Binary-Coded Decimal) value of shift 
register state. For instance, let the state of electric shift register be S = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0). At the 1st output port of 
FDLs bank, the time delay will depend on the BCD value of the leftmost three digits (1, 1, 1) of electric shift 
register state. Converse the three binary digits (1, 1, 1) to decimal, a BCD value of ‘7’ is obtained. Similarly, the 
next to the leftmost three digits is (1, 1, 0) and the corresponding BCD value is ‘6’ for the 2nd output port of FDLs 
bank. Take in the same way for other output ports, we can obtain a time-delay vector of D = (7, 6, 1, 4, 2, 5, 3). The 
i-th element of D represents the delay value of the i-th output port of the FDLs bank.  
 
 (a).                                                                                                                  (b).  
Fig. 2.  At transmitter side, the summed coded spectra before code reconfiguration.  
 
Fig.3. At receiver side, FDLs/OSWs de-scramble spectral chips before code reconfiguration.  
 
Upper
AWG
Router
Lower
AWG
Router
įįį
User#1
User#2
User# 7
įįį
Star
Coupler
Controller
NXN
NXN
Electrical Shift Register
ĲġġġġġġĲġġġġġġĲġġġġġġıġġġġġġıġġġġġĲġġġġġġıġġġ
Electrical Shift Register
ıġġġġġıġġġġġġıġġġġġġĲġġġġġġĲġġġġġıġġġġġġĲġġġ
(1)
1O
O(1)2
(1)
3O
0
0
0
(1)
6O
(2)
3λ
(2)
4λ
0
(2)
2O
0
(2)
7
0
O
't
(1)
1O
O(1)2
(1)
3O
0
0
0
(1)
6O
(2)
3λ
(2)
4λ
0
(2)
2O
0
(2)
7
0
O
't
43 Jen-Fa Huang et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  39 – 46 
Figure 2 illustrates the encoder output before signature reconfiguration. Assume that the state of electrical shift 
register is (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0). The optical switches are unconnected when the element of the shift register is zero, 
and vice versa. Here the output ports #1, #2, #3, and #6 are connected, while the other output ports are disconnected. 
As illustrated in Fig. 2(a), signals at AWG o/p ports will be post-switched and encoded on following the switches 
connection of (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0). The values of time delay have been calculated to be D1 = (7, 6, 1, 4, 2, 5, 3). After 
wavelength-spreading and time-hopping, a 2-D matrix code over wavelength/time dimensions is obtained as shown 
in Fig. 2(b). The wavelength scale is divided into N wavelength-bins, and the time scale is divided into N time-chips. 
The orange part is for user#1 and the blue part for user#2.  
The coded signals are combined in the star coupler and transmitted to the receivers. The received spectral 
signal is defined to be R = (r1, r2, …, rN) = 6k=1N bkXk , where bk = {0, 1} is the k-th user’s data bit. To recover the 
user’s data bit, correlation subtraction of RXk and RXk is performed. For the value of correlation subtraction greater 
than zero, data bit “1” is decided. If the result of correlation subtraction is a negative number, we assume data bit “0” 
is sent. Figure 3 illustrates the processes the FDLs de-hop and OSWs de-spread spectral chips for receiver users 
prior to signature reconfiguration when the shift register state is initially S1 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0). A 2-D code matrix 
should be recovered to 1-D sequence code on the time delay device. The value of time delay on encoder side is 
calculated to be D1 = (7, 6, 1, 4, 2, 5, 3). So on decoder side, we should complement the time delay value to be D1’ = 
(1, 2, 7, 4, 6, 3, 5). After proper time de-hopping and wavelength de-spreading, the original spectral signal sequence 
R1 = (1, 2, 2, 1, 0, 1, 1) is recovered.  
 
ġġġġġġ ġġġġġ ġġġġġġġġġġġġ 
(a).                                                                                                                    (b).  
Fig. 4. At transmitter side, the summed coded spectra after code reconfiguration.  
Fig. 5. At receiver side, FDLs/OSWs de-scramble spectral chips after code reconfiguration.  
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Following the same line of thinking, we examine the wavelength/time double-scrambling situation but now 
under posteriori code reconfiguration. Figure 4 shows the encoder output after signature reconfiguration in which the 
output ports of optical switches #1, #3, #4, and #5 are connected. The time delay matrix is changed after the 
controlling shift register changes its state. The time delay is now calculated to be D3 = (5, 3, 7, 6, 4, 1, 2); the 
wavelength distribution of receiver users in 2-D code matrix is different to Figure 3 on the priori signature 
reconfiguration. Figure 5 illustrates the processes the FDLs de-hop and OSWs de-spread spectral chips for receiver 
users posterior to signature reconfiguration when the shift register switches to state S3 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1). The time 
delay matrix is recovered to 1-D code and get back to the signal spectrum R3 = (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 0). Due to the double 
scrambling scheme over time/wavelength for a cryptographic OCDMA data transmission, the security is enhanced.  
 
TABLE I. Transmitted summed spectral signal, (a). before and (b). after signature reconfigurations.  
(a). Before signature reconfiguration  
Users  Data bits Coded signal sequences after OSWs spreading 
Signal sequences after 
FDLs hopping 
Transmitted summed 
spectral signal  
#1 1, 1, … (O1,O2,O3,0,0,O6,0), (O1,O2,O3,0,0,O6,0), … 
(0,0,0,O3,O6,O2,O1),  
(0,0, 0 ,O3,O6,O2,O1), … 
R1= (1,2,2,1,0,1,1),     
(2,1,2,1,1,1,0), … #2 
1, 0, … (0,O2,O3,O4,0,0,O7), 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), … 
(0,0,0,O4,O7,O3,O2), 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), … 
#3 0, 1, … (0,0,0,0,0,0,0), (O1,0,O3,O4,O5,0,0), … 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), 
(0, 0, 0,O5,O1,O4,O3), … 
(b). After signature reconfiguration  
Users  Data bits Coded signal sequences after OSWs spreading 
signal sequences after 
FDLs hopping 
Transmitted summed 
spectral signal  
#1 1, 1, … (O1,0,O3,O4,O5,0,0), (O1,0,O3,O4,O5,0,0), … 
(0,0,0,O5,O1,O4,O3),  
(0,0,0,O5,O1,O4,O3), … 
R3= (1,1,1,2,2,1,0),     
(1,0,2,1,2,1,1), … #2 
1, 0, … (0,O2,0,O4,O5,O6,0), 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), … 
(0,0,0,O6,O2,O5,O4), 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), … 
#3 0, 1, … (0,0,0,0,0,0,0), (0,0,O3,0,O5,O6,O7), … 
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0), 
(0,0,0,O7,O3,O6,O5), … 
 
On the transmitter side, following from Figures 2 and 4, Table I summarizes the spectral encoding for the 
illustrative users before and after signature reconfigurations. Before signature reconfiguration, as depicted in Table 
I(a), users#1 and #2 are supposed active in the first time slot with coded spectral chips (O1,O2,O3,0,0,O6,0) and 
(0,O2,O3,O4,0,0,O7) while other users are inactive with all zero coded chips. The summed spectral signal is therefore 
R1,1 = (O1, 2O2, 2O3,O4, 0, O6,O7) = (1,2,2,1,0,1,1). In the second time slot, users#1 and #3 are active with coded 
spectral chips (O1,O2,O3,0,0,O6,0) and (O1,0,O3,O4,O5,0,0) while other users are inactive with all zero coded chips. The 
summed spectral signal then becomes R1,2 = (2O1, O2, 2O3, O4, O5, O6, ) = (2,1,2,1,1,1,0). Following the same 
discussions, Table I(b) illustrates the corresponding coding processes after signature reconfiguration. The summed 
spectral signal will be respectively R3,1 = (O1, O2, O3, 2O4, 2O5, O6,) = (1,1,1,2,2,1,0) in the first coding slot and R3,2 
= (O1, , 2O3, O4, 2O5, O6, O7) = (1,0,2,1,2,1,1)  in the second coding slot.  
 
On the receiver side, following from Figures 3 and 5, Table II summarizes the spectral decoding for the 
illustrative user activities before and after signature reconfigurations. Table II(a) illustrates the corresponding data 
decoding for communicator #1 and eavesdropper before signature reconfiguration. Based on the subtracted energy 
passing through the threshold device, the corresponding data bit of user#1 is decided to be logic “1”. Table II(b) 
illustrates the corresponding data decoding after code reconfiguration. The solved data bits won’t be changed at the 
intended user #1 decoder because the transceiver codecs would change their new signature codes in synchronized. 
But on the perspective of eavesdropper, he doesn’t know signature code has already changed and still assumes 
signature code X1 for his data decoding. The subtracted correlation energy will therefore be 0 units. This results in 
an assumption of transmitting bit ‘0’ on the sight of eavesdropper. As the wrong information is detected by the 
tapping process, the degree of security to the proposed system is improved.  
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TABLE II. Decoded data for intended user and eavesdropper; (a). before and (b). after signature reconfigurations.  
(a). Decoded data bits before reconfiguration.  
 
Received spectral 
sequence  
Signal sequences 
after FDLs de-
hopping  
Signal sequences 
after OSWs 
despreading  
Subtracted correlation energy  
Decode
d data 
bits 
User #1 R1 = (1,2,2,1,0,1,1), 
(2,1,2,1,1,1,0),  
… 
(1,2,2,1,0,1,1),  
(2,1,2,1,1,1,0), … 
(1,2,2,0,0,1,0),  
(2,1,2,0,0,1,0), … 
|(1,2,2,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,1,0,0,1)| =4,  
|(2,1,2,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,1,1,0,0)| =4, …  1, 1, … 
Eavesdrop
per 
(1,2,2,1,0,1,1),  
(2,1,2,1,1,1,0), … 
(1,2,2,0,0,1,0),  
(2,1,2,0,0,1,0), … 
|(1,2,2,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,1,0,0,1)| =4, 
|(2,1,2,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,1,1,0,0)| =4, …  1, 1, … 
(b). Decoded data bits after reconfiguration.  
 
Received spectral 
sequence 
Signal sequences 
after FDLs de-
hopping  
Signal sequences 
after OSWs 
despreading  
Subtracted correlation energy 
Decode
d data 
bits 
User #1 R3 = (1,1,1,2,2,1,0), 
(1,0,2,1,2,1,1),  
… 
(1,1,1,2,2,1,0),  
(1,0,2,1,2,1,1), … 
(1,0,1,2,2,0,0),  
(1,0,2,1,2,0,0), … 
|(1,0,1,2,2,0,0)| - |(0,1,0,0,0,1,0)| =4, 
|(1,0,2,1,2,0,0)| - |(0,0,0,0,0,1,1)| =4, …  1, 1, … 
Eavesdrop
per 
(1,1,1,0,0,1,0),  
(1,0,2,0,0,1,0), … 
(1,1,1,0,0,1,0),  
(1,0,2,0,0,1,0), … 
|(1,1,1,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,2,2,0,0)| =0, 
|(1,0,2,0,0,1,0)| - |(0,0,0,1,2,0,1)| =0, …  0, 0, … 
 
5. Performance evaluation  
Here, we will make a theoretical evaluation on the network confidentiality provided by the proposed composite 
coding technique and enhanced with the signatures reconfiguration mechanism. On making such security analysis, 
we assume that an adversary knows the communication network parameters. In particular, the eavesdropper knows 
what types of OCDMA network signals are being sent: the data rate, the type of encoding, and the structure of the 
codes -- but not the particular code that an individual user employs. The same principles are applied in the analysis 
of cryptographic systems, and are often stated in the form of Kerckhoffs’s principle, which essentially states that one 
should assume that the eavesdropper knows everything about the cryptographic algorithm except for the key that 
each user employs.  
 
By Kerckhoffs’s principle, the minimum requirement for eavesdropper to intercept the system lies in code-
searching time less than code reconfiguration period. We assume that the code-searching time is an exponential 
distribution; the equation can be represented as  
 
f(t) = X(D-1)ODexp(-Ot)/*(D),    t>0,D>0.  
 
Here O is the probability of an eavesdropper searching the exact code word within one bit interval, and D is the 
number of reconfigurable codes. If the code-searching time t is smaller than the code reconfiguration period x, the 
system will be intercepted. We can assume a specific SNR of eavesdroppers to calculate the actual probability of the 
system intercepted. Here is the probability of an eavesdropper searching the exact signature code within one bit 
interval. The probability can be represented as  
P [t ≥ x] =׬ ௑ሺഀషభሻఒഀ௘ሺషഊ೟ሻ葇ሺఈሻ
ஶ
௫
 
The probability of the system been intercepted Pintercepted can therefore be represented as  
 
Pintercepted = 1- P[t ≥ x].  
 
In Figure 6, the green line is the system without code reconfiguration scheme. The red and blue lines are with 
code reconfiguration scheme. We can know that the system with code-reconfiguration will be more confidential than 
the system without code-reconfiguration. Note that whether the SNR eavesdropper can attain, the probability of 
correction will be stable by reconfiguring the codes assigned to the users. By using above derivation, we can easily 
define different code size system confidentiality. From Figure 7, the probability of correct detection in the system 
using composite code N=7 is smaller than the system using composite code N=15 whatever the SNR that 
eavesdropper can detect. We deduce that if we have small code size, the system will reconfigure the signature code 
more frequently to ensure the system confidentiality.  
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Fig. 6. Probability of correct detection with code reconfiguration scheme.             Fig. 7. Reconfiguring time to the probability of the system 
intercepted with different code size.  
 
Improving the degree of security or enhancing the performance of networks have their impacts on each other 
such that a decision has to be made for cases in which all or some of these requirements are desired but cannot be 
fulfilled. The tradeoffs between security and the performance in reconfigurable OCDMA network, based on our 
signature coding system, are presented. From the security viewpoint, the reconfigurable OCDMA network designer 
should minimize the eavesdropper ability to detect code word pulses by controlling the authorized performance to 
reasonable throughput. Otherwise, error correction codes techniques used in commercial optical communications 
would be the solution to obtain the maximum acceptable system BER.  
 
6. Conclusions  
We have proposed a scheme to combat with eavesdropping based on signatures reconfiguration of hybrid 
WH/TS OCDMA networks. In the proposed scheme, each user wills dynamically changing these signature codes to 
enhance network confidentiality. According to the discussion of this paper, when central station find the threat of the 
system, it can send a command to each node to change the code sets assigned for each user to enhance the 
confidentiality. The code reconfiguration combats code detection attack of eavesdropper and enhances system 
confidentiality significantly if the transmitter changed the code more quickly than the eavesdropper could detect the 
signature correctly. When number of signature codes increases and the eavesdropper’s detection becomes more 
difficult, thus network confidentiality is significantly increased. The proposed scheme has a number of attractive 
features such as asynchronous network coordination, reduced transceiver encoder/decoders, and enhanced system 
confidentiality.  
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